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Choosing the Field of Study in Post-Secondary Education: 
Do Expected Earnings Matter?
*
 
This paper examines the determinants of the choice of the major when the length of studies 
is uncertain, by using a framework in which students entering post-secondary education are 
assumed to anticipate their future earnings. For that purpose, we use French data coming 
from the 1992 and 1998 Génération surveys collected by the Centre d’Etudes et de 
Recherches sur l’Emploi et les Qualifications (CEREQ, Marseille). Our econometric approach 
is based on a semi-structural three-equations model, which is identified thanks to some 
exclusion restrictions. We exploit in particular exogenous variations in the earnings returns 
associated with the majors across the business cycle, in order to identify the causal effect of 
expected earnings on the probability of choosing a given major. Relying on a three-
component mixture distribution, we account for correlation between the unobserved 
individual-specific terms affecting the preferences for the majors, the unobserved individual-
specific factors entering the equation determining the length of studies within each major, and 
that affecting the labor market earnings equation. Following Arcidiacono and Jones (2003), 
we use the EM algorithm with a sequential maximization step to produce consistent 
parameter estimates. Simulating for each given major a 10 percent increase in the expected 
earnings suggests that expected earnings have a statistically significant but quantitatively 
small impact on the allocation of students across majors. 
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Over recent years, the French post-secondary education system has been the subject of much
debate and sharp criticism. In a report for the French Council of Economic Analysis, Aghion and
Cohen (2004) emphasize the main difﬁculties that this system, and especially the French univer-
sity, have to cope with. Pointing out, among others, the high dropout rate in French universities,
they argue that the French post-secondary education system needs urgently to be reformed. In
this context, it seems in particular crucial to understand students’ educational choices.
In this paper, we focus on the effect of expected labor market income on the choice of the
post-secondary ﬁeld of study. In particular, we assess the sensitivity of students’ major choices to
expected earnings by estimating a semi-structural model of post-secondary educational choices.
More precisely, we try to disentangle the simultaneous effects of, on the one hand, preferences
and abilities, and on the other hand, expected returns, on the choice of major. In the existing ap-
plied literature, several papers explicitly consider the impact of expected labor market earnings
on schooling choices. A ﬁrst set of papers study these issues by using a rational expectations
framework. In a seminal paper, Willis and Rosen (1979) allow the demand for college education
to depend on expected future earnings.1 Assuming that students form rational (i.e. unbiased)
expectations, these authors show that the expected ﬂow of post-education earnings are strong de-
terminants of college attendance. Berger (1988) also focuses on the impact of expected earnings
on the individual demand for post-secondary education: his results show that, when choosing
college majors, students are more inﬂuenced by the expected ﬂow of future earnings than by
their expected initial earnings.2 Then, following Keane and Wolpin (1997), several econometri-
cians have estimated structural dynamic models of schooling decisions (Cameron and Heckman,
1998, 2001; Eckstein and Wolpin 1999; Keane and Wolpin, 2001; Belzil and Hansen, 2002;
Lee, 2005).3 Their papers assume that students form rational earnings expectations conditional
on schooling decisions, and that the expected earnings affect in turn their educational choices.
Recently, Arcidiacono (2004, 2005) has considered sequential models of college attendance, ac-
counting both for the demand as well as the supply side of schooling, in which the value of
each major depends on the corresponding expected ﬂow of earnings. However, in the literature
quoted above, papers by Berger (1988) and Arcidiacono (2004, 2005) are the only ones focusing
on the effect of expected earnings on the choice of major and not on the educational level. Our
paper builds on this literature by assuming that students face an uncertain length of studies when
choosing their post-secondary major. As we will see further, including uncertainty in terms of
level of education within each major seems to be necessary to correctly account for the observed
educational paths.
A second set of papers examines the validity of the rational expectations assumption in the
1On a related ground, Altonji (1993) estimates a sequential model in which schooling decisions depend on
expected returns to education, without explicitly considering the choice of major.
2Several other articles have shown that there exist some large differences in earnings across majors in the U.S.
(see, for instance, James et al., 1989; Loury and Garman, 1995; Brewer, Eide and Ehrenberg, 1999) However, none
of these papers model the choice of the major itself as a function of expected earnings.
3Unlike the preceding papers which rely on partial equilibrium settings, Lee(2005) speciﬁes and estimates a
general equilibrium model of work, schooling and occupational choices.
2context of educational choices. More precisely, these papers consider the speciﬁcation and the
estimationofschoolingdecisionmodelsinwhichtherationalexpectationsassumptionisrelaxed.
In particular, Freeman (1971, 1975) and Manski (1993) have proposed models assuming that in-
dividuals have myopic expectations relatively to their potential labor market earnings. Within
such a framework, students are assumed to form their wage expectations by observing the earn-
ings of comparable individuals who are currently working. According to Manski’s terminology,
such expectations are computed “in the manner of practicing econometricians”. More recently,
Boudarbat and Montmarquette (2007) examine the effect of expected earnings on the choice of
the ﬁeld of studies in Canada; for that purpose, they estimate a mixed multinomial logit model
applied to the choice of major, using a sample of Canadian university graduates. These authors
also relax the assumption of rational expectations; assuming myopic expectations, the predicted
earnings are computed from the wages of young individuals who have the same education level
and who are currently working.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the effects of expected earnings on schooling
choices in several ways. First, unlike the previous papers, our approach concentrates on the
effects of expected earnings on the choice of the major, in a framework in which the length of
post-secondary studies is uncertain to the individual when choosing her major. Stylized facts
appear to be consistent with such a framework.4 Another interesting feature of our paper lies in
the fact that we exploit the arguably exogenous variation across the business cycle in the relative
returns to each major in order to identify these elasticity parameters.
Using the parameter estimates of our model, we calculate the elasticities of major choices to
expected earnings by simulating exogenous variations of earnings distribution. These elasticities
appear to be very low, which means that the choice of a major is mainly driven by non-pecuniary
factors.
Our study has two main restrictions. First, in the absence of appropriate information al-
lowing identiﬁcation of risk-aversion coefﬁcients, we cannot identify a model incorporating in-
dividual attitudes towards risk.5 However, by allowing for heteroskedacticity in the variance
of log-earnings and by imposing a CRRA utility function with a ﬁxed risk aversion parameter,
we then estimate an additional speciﬁcation of our baseline model. Second, we also ignore the
possibility for the student to switch major during her post-secondary studies. Such a switch is
potentially an endogenous event whose treatment would make the model much more compli-
cated. However, stylized facts show that this last assumption is sensible for the pooled majors
that we consider (see Table 8, Appendix A).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our econometric
model. The speciﬁcation of this model and the likelihood function are discussed in Section 3.
Section 4 describes the data and presents some preliminary statistics, while Section 5 presents
the identiﬁcation strategy and Section 6 contains the estimation and simulation results. Finally,
Section 7 summarizes and concludes.
4Indeed, descriptive statistics from the French Panel 1989 database (DEPP, French Ministry of Education) show
that most students complete a ﬁnal level of education which is different from the level they wanted to reach when
entering college (see Appendix A, Table 9).
5Among recent studies addressing this issue, the reader can consult papers by Belzil and Hansen (2004), Saks
and Shore (2005), Brodaty, Gary-Bobo and Prieto (2006).
32 The econometric model
Aftergraduatingfromhigh-school, individualsareassumedtochoosetheirﬁeldofpost-secondary
study (major). In this major, they reach some (partly random) level of education. Note that we
restrict our analysis to individuals who attend university.6 Once they leave the post-secondary
education system, they are supposed to enter the labor market. Thus we consider a sequence of
three events:
• First stage: when entering college, each student chooses her post-secondary major;
• Second stage: she keeps on studying in the ﬁeld chosen in the ﬁrst stage, until she reaches
an endogenously determined level of education (dropout, college, BA degree, MA degree,
graduate);
• Third stage: she leaves the post-secondary education system and participates in the labor
market.
Following Heckman and Singer (1984), we assume that there are R types of individuals,
Πr denoting the proportion of type r in the population of students.7 Individuals are supposed to
knowtheirtypewhichisnotobservedbytheeconometrician. Withinthisframework, unobserved
heterogeneity (i.e. unobserved preferences for each major, unobserved schooling ability and
unobserved labor market productivity) is type-speciﬁc.
2.1 Stage 1: Choice of the major
After graduating from high-school (and getting the ﬁnal high-school diploma, called “Baccalau-
réat” in France), the individual who decides to continue studying must choose the college major,
hereafter indexed by j∗.8 We assume that this choice is made among a set of M majors. Further-
more, we assume that the chosen ﬁeld j∗ depends on the individual’s expectations concerning
both the education level that she will achieve within this major (stage 2), and her future labor
market earnings, which are assumed to depend on her educational level (stage 3). An important
underlying assumption is that future earnings as well as the highest level of education reached in
ﬁeld j∗ are partly uncertain.9
For a student of type r, let us denote by V r
j the value function associated with the choice of
ﬁeld j (j = 1,...,M). This value function is assumed to be composed of two additive elements,
6The argument justifying our choice to focus on individuals attending university is detailed in the section devoted
to the data.
7Examples of econometric models of schooling decisions relying on a similar assumption can be found in Keane
and Wolpin (1997, 2001), Eckstein and Wolpin (1999), Cameron and Heckman (1998, 2001), Belzil and Hansen
(2002, 2004), Arcidiacono (2004, 2005) and Lee (2005).
8We omit the individual subscript for the sake of simplicity.
9We suppose that each individual has an idiosyncratic propensity to achieve a high level of education. This
propensity is partly affected by random factors, such as her own health status and unexpected changes in her family
environment. These factors are ex ante unknown by the individual when choosing her major, and then revealed
when attending university.
4respectively denoted by v0j and vr
1j. The ﬁrst term vr
0j represents the intrinsic value (i.e. the
consumption value) of the major, while vr
1j may be considered as the investment value of a post-
secondaryeducationinﬁeldj.Itisafunctionofthesumoftheexpectedfutureaverage(monthly)
labor market earnings which are associated with the L+1 educational levels that can be reached
within ﬁeld j, each of these expected values being weighted by the probability Pr(K = k | J =
j) to reach the k-th educational level (k = 0,...,L) within ﬁeld j (j = 1,...,M). Here k = L
denotes the highest educational level that can be reached within major j, and k = 0 corresponds
to the case where the student drops out from the major before terminating the ﬁrst year of college.
Then, for a student of type r, the value V r























e(j,k) | r,J = j,K = k
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denoting the expected ﬂow of earnings associated with education
(j,k), for a student of type r, and α being an unknown sensitivity parameter to be estimated.10
The subcomponent vr
0j can be interpreted as the non-pecuniary value of ﬁeld j for a student
of type r. It may correspond to the “social gratiﬁcation” brought by studying in major j or to the
individual’s taste for this major. We assume that vr
0j is a linear function of a set of observable
individual covariates that affect the attractiveness of ﬁeld j (e.g. gender, place of birth, parents’
nationality and profession, past educational history of the student, including the cumulated delay
when entering secondary school). It is also depending on a type-speciﬁc intercept αr
(1,j) and on a
random term uj independent of αr
(1,j). Consequently, vr












1 is a parameter vector associated with X1 and speciﬁc to ﬁeld j. The individual chooses
the education ﬁeld j∗ that corresponds to the highest value function:
j





2.2 Stage 2: Determination of the length of studies
Once a student of type r has chosen her major j∗, she studies until she reaches a level k∗
j of
education within ﬁeld j. We assume that this level k∗
j is an element of a set of L + 1 possible
levels corresponding to the different degrees which may be obtained in each major; k = 0
corresponds to a dropout, which occurs when a student leaves university during the ﬁrst year
of college (without any post-secondary degree), k = 1 refers to the degree called “DEUG” in
France which is generally obtained after two years of college, k = 2 corresponds to the BA
10The functional form of probabilities Pr(K = k | r,J = j) is speciﬁed in the next section.
5degree (called “Licence” in France), k = 3 corresponds to the MA degree (“Maîtrise”) and
k = L = 4 refers to the Graduate level.
The length of studies k∗
j within major j is supposed to be determined by the individual
propensity e kj to succeed in long post-secondary studies within this major.11 More precisely,
we assume that the length of studies k∗





    
    
0 if e kr
j ≤ s1
1 if s1 < e kr
j ≤ s2
. . .
L if sL < e kr
j
where{s1,...,sL}arelatent(unknown)thresholdsthatcorrespondtotheminimumabilitylevels
required to obtain the different degrees. The latent propensity e kr
j is assumed to depend linearly on
observable covariates X2 (such as gender, nationality, parents’ profession, etc..). It also depends
on a type-speciﬁc intercept αr
2 and on an independent term v which is unknown ex ante by the
student when she decides to enter college. Thus the propensity e kr







2,jβ2 + v (2)
where αr
2 and β2 are unknown parameters to be estimated. In this expression, X2,j is a vector
of exogenous regressors including individual characteristics but also covariates that are speciﬁc
to the major j. Namely, we allow the average proportion of college students in the same major
and in the same university to affect the length of studies.12 In the absence of variables plausibly
affecting the choice of major but not the length of studies, we choose to exclude major-speciﬁc
dummies in X2,j since the related coefﬁcients would only be identiﬁed through nonlinearities.
Note that, in our framework, the length of studies is not the number of years spent effectively
in post-secondary education, but the terminal level of education that is reached by the student,
whatever the time spent at the university. We should also remark that we do not account for
selection of applicants by the university administration at the entry of college: this seems to be a
quite sensible assumption for the French university system.
2.3 Stage 3: Labor market earnings
Having obtained the educational level (degree) k∗
j in major j∗, the student then enters the la-
bor market. We assume that the labor market is an absorbing state: individuals do not resume
studies after entering the labor force. When making her post-secondary schooling decision in
the ﬁrst stage, the individual is assumed to anticipate the impact of the major and of the length
of the studies on her future labor market earnings. In order to take both employment and non-
employment spells into account, we refer to average earnings as the sum of wages weighted
11This framework is consistent with an ordered probit model.
12This variable is calculated using information coming from the SISE database provided by the French Ministry
of Education.
6by employment spell durations, and unemployment beneﬁts13 weighted by unemployment spell
durations. Hence, the logarithm of the average monthly earnings received over a period of length
























where Ne (respectively, Nu) is the number of observed employment (unemployment) spells in
the individual labor market history, ws,jk is the monthly wage in the s-th employment spell, le
s
(respectively, bs0,jk is the monthly unemployment beneﬁt in the s0-th unemployment spell, lu
s) are
durations of the s-th employment (respectively, unemployment) spell, and Tobs is the total length






Thereafter, we focus only on this aggregate notion of labor market earnings, without mod-
eling separately wages and individual probabilities of employment (and nonemployment). This
appears to be consistent with the students’ behavior when they take their post-secondary school-
ing decisions: most individuals anticipate future labor market conditions as a whole, without
separately taking into account the effects of their educational choices on wages and on employ-
ment probabilities.
Labor market earnings depend on the post-secondary educational ﬁeld and level, namely on
the pair (j∗,k∗
j). Note that our framework accounts for the earnings gaps, not only across school-
ing levels (within a given ﬁeld of study), but also across ﬁelds of study (for a given educational
level, or degree). Earnings are also supposed to be a function of exogenous and predetermined
individual characteristics. For a student of type r, the average log-earnings equation is assumed







3(j,k)β3 +  (5)
where X3(j,k) is a vector of observed characteristics that may affect labor market earnings, in-
cluding post-secondary education, αr
3 represents the type-speciﬁc intercept, and  denotes an
independent random factor that affects the individual’s earnings.
3 Model speciﬁcation
Let us recall that the type-speciﬁc intercepts are mass points of a discrete distribution with prob-
abilities (Π1,...,ΠR) verifying
PR
r=1 Πr = 1, and that the residuals of the three equations are
stochastically independent of these type-speciﬁc intercepts.14
13Unemployment beneﬁts are assumed to be equal to a constant times the former wage received when employed.
This constant is taken equal to 0.7 as often done in the literature.
14Some covariates introduced in the equations may not be independent of the individual’s type. It applies espe-
cially to the high school graduation track, which may be in particular related to unobserved preferences for each
73.1 Stochastic assumptions
Residualsaresupposedtobenormallydistributed. Weassumethattherandomvector(u1,...,uM)
affecting the choice equation, and the residuals v and  entering the two other equations are inde-
pendently distributed.15 Consequently, the whole vector of residuals16 is assumed to be distrib-
uted as: 













where Σ is the (M + 1) × (M + 1) covariance matrix of the model residuals, with Σ[1,1] = 1




   
 

1 ... ... ... ... ...
0 1 ... ... ... ...
0 Σ32 Σ33 ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ...
0 ΣM2 ... ... ΣMM ...
0 0 ... ... 0 Σ(M+1),(M+1)





The particular order of the residuals in this vector enables us both to use Cholesky decomposition










1 0 0 ... ... 0
0 1 0 0 ... 0
0 α32 exp(d1) 0 ... 0
... ... ... ... ... ....






Note that we impose the positivity of the diagonal terms of matrix Γ. Hence, the Cholesky
decomposition of Σ is unique.
major. Nevertheless, conditioning the type probabilities on the high school graduation track did not change signiﬁ-
cantly our results.





16Only differences in utility levels matter in random utility models.
83.2 The likelihood function
Under our stochastic assumptions, the contribution to the likelihood function of an individual
of type r who chooses the major j∗, who reaches the educational level (k∗
j), and who gets the
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ϕ and Φ being respectively the density and cumulative density functions of the standard normal
distribution N(0,1).Note that the ﬁrst stage of the econometric model corresponds to the esti-
mation of a multinomial probit model. Within this framework, the choice probabilities Pr(j|r)
do not have a closed-form expression.17 As it is detailed in the following section devoted to data,
estimations are based on J = 3 aggregated majors. Thus, in stage 1, each choice probability is
expressed as a double integral which can be evaluated using usual integration procedures (such
as quadrature methods), without the need to rely on a GHK probit simulator.
Unconditional on the type, the contribution to the likelihood function of a student who
chooses the ﬁeld j∗, who reaches the educational level k∗
j∗ and who gets the average labor market
log-earnings lnwj∗,k∗



















j∗|r) denotes the individual contribution to the likelihood given the type
r.
17Each choice probability is a J − 1 dimensional integral which must be evaluated numerically.
93.3 Estimation
In order to present our estimation strategy, let us introduce some further notations: θF denotes
the whole parameters of the choice equation, θL those of the equation for the length of studies,
and ﬁnally θW those of the wage equation. These vectors do not include type-speciﬁc intercepts.
As it is usual for a ﬁnite mixture of gaussian distributions, we rely on the Expectation-
Maximization (EM) algorithm (Dempster, Laird and Rubin, 1977) to estimate our model. This
algorithm works by iterating the two following steps until the stability of the log-likelihood func-
tion is reached.











vector, the values (π
(n)
r )r=1...R of the mixture distribution and the values (α
(n)
r )(r) of the type-
speciﬁc intercepts, which are all obtained from the previous iteration of the algorithm. More
precisely, the two steps are the following:
B E-step
For each type r = 1,...,R, and for each individual i, the posterior probability for the
































i,wi|Ti = r,(Πr)r,(αr)r,θF,θL,θW) (11)
B M-step
Wemaximizetheexpectedcompletedlog-likelihoodfunctionintermsof((Πr)r,(αr)r,θF,θL,θW).
This maximization can be done in two successive steps.
















Then, due to the partial separability of the conditional completed log-likelihood function
(Arcidiacono and Jones, 2003), we get three sequential optimization problems since resid-





















































It implies that ﬁrst, we maximize the log-wage equation. Given the estimates of this equa-
tion, we estimate the parameters of the equation for the length of studies. Finally, given the
previous estimates, we maximize the choice equation. Although this procedure does not
yield full information maximum likelihood estimates, Arcidiacono and Jones (2003) show
that this method produces consistent estimates of the parameters, with large computational
savings.
In order to get standard errors estimates, we rely on a parametric bootstrap procedure,
instead of a non parametric one, since this last method is unstable when applied to the EM
algorithm. The parametric bootstrap consists ﬁrst in obtaining reliable parameter estimates
denoted b θ. We get b θ by replicating the previously described EM algorithm with different
random initial values for the parameters. The iteration process is necessary to ensure the








h=1...H. For each newly generated data set, we estimate
θ∗



















The model presented above is estimated using French data coming from the “Génération 92”
and “Génération 98” surveys, which are collected by the Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur
l’Emploi et les Qualiﬁcations (CEREQ, Marseille).18 The “Génération 92” survey consists of
18These data have been previously used by Brodaty, Gary-Bobo and Prieto (2006), who estimate a structural
model of individual educational investments in presence of students’ attitudes toward risk.
11a large sample of 26,359 individuals who left the French educational system in 1992 and were
interviewed ﬁve years later, in 1997. In the original sample, education levels range from the
lowest to the highest one, respectively referred to as “Level VI” and “Level I” in the French
nomenclature. This database has the main advantage to contain information on both educational
and labor market histories (over the ﬁrst ﬁve years following the exit from the educational sys-
tem). Furthermore, the survey provides a set of individual covariates which are used as controls
in our estimation procedure such as gender, place of birth, nationality, parents’ profession, and
residence when leaving the educational system. Most of the individual covariates observed in
the “Génération 92” survey are also provided by the “Génération 98” survey, which consists of
a sample of 22,021 individuals who left the French educational system six years later, in 1998,
and were interviewed in 2003.19 In this paper, we exploit the pooled dataset which contains
information on a total of 48,380 individuals entering the labor market either in 1992 or in 1998.
Our subsample of interest is constituted of respondents to these surveys and who have at least
passed the national high school ﬁnal examination. It is then restricted to 27,389 individuals. Fur-
thermore, within this selected sample, we restrict our analysis to the individuals having attended
university, except medicine faculties and IUT (“Institut Universitaire de Technologie”, which are
two-year vocational colleges). This sample selection was made in order to keep an homogeneous
set of post-secondary tracks, both in terms of selection and possible length of studies. Missing
covariates values ﬁnally leaves us with a sample of 7,346 individuals.20
Post-secondary studies are aggregated into three broad ﬁelds: “Sciences”, “Humanities and
Social Sciences” (including art studies) and “Law, Economics and Management”. We then con-
sider ﬁve different educational levels (i.e. degrees) that may be reached within each major. They
are respectively denoted by “dropout” (less than two years of college), “two years of college”,
“BA degree” (“Licence” in French), “MA degree” (“Maîtrise”) and “Graduate” (more than four
years after High School). Tables 1 and 2 below provide basic descriptive statistics for the selected
subsample. Table 7 (reported in Appendix A) provides a descriptive outlook for the determinants
of post-secondary schooling choices in France.
We ﬁrst focus on the choice of the major. Table 7 shows that this choice is related with
gender, the age in 6th grade,21 and parents’ profession.
Noteworthy, male students are more likely to attend majors in Sciences (39.40% among male
vs. 16.42% among females) while female students are more likely to attend majors in Humanities
and Social Sciences (29.32% among males vs. 48.93% among females). The student’s age in 6th
grade and the chosen ﬁeld are highly correlated: individuals who were above the “normal” age
in 6th grade are less likely to attend a major in Science, while they are more likely to attend a
major in Law, Economics and Management.
19Although a longer observation window is available for each Génération dataset, the average log-earnings are
computed using only the observations from 1992 to 1995 for Génération 1992 (resp. 1998 to 2001 for Génération
1998). In particular, restricting to a 4-years window allow us to limit the number of individuals that have to be
dropped because of missing earnings values, in addition to the fact that it allows us to work with two periods of
virtually opposed economic conditions and helps identifying the earnings elasticities of major choices.
20In order to prevent our estimates to be driven by outliers, we also drop individuals with average log-earnings
below the 2.5 percentile (respectively above the 97.5 percentile) of the log-earnings distribution.
21This variable can be seen as a proxy for the individual schooling ability.
12Parental characteristics also seem to play in important role on the choice of the major. The
higher the parents’ social category, the higher the probability to study sciences. For instance,
individuals whose father is a blue-collar worker are more likely to attend a major in Human and
Social Sciences, and less likely to attend a major in Sciences.22 Table 7 also shows a strong
correlation between the chosen ﬁeld and the length of studies. Only one quarter of graduates
complete their degree in Humanities and Social Sciences. Unlike graduates, half of dropouts
during the ﬁrst two years of college studied Humanities.
Finally, the higher the educational level, the larger the mean of log-earnings (see Table 3 re-
ported below): graduates earn 1.7 times more than dropouts. There are signiﬁcant differences in
average earnings associated with the different majors: sciences ranks ﬁrst, followed by law, eco-
nomics and management, and ﬁnally humanities and social sciences. The discrepancy between
majors is greater in 1998 than in 1992. Sciences and law, economics and management beneﬁted
from the macroeconomic expansion that occurred in the late 90’s.




Humanities and Social Sciences 2,761 37.59
Law, Economics and Management 2,479 33.75
Post-secondary education level
Dropout 1,762 23.99
Two years of college 732 9.97
Licence (BA degree) 1,400 19.06
Maîtrise (MA degree) 1,486 20.23
Post Maîtrise (Graduates) 1,966 26.76
Source: Surveys Générations 1992 and 1998 (CEREQ, Marseille)
22Mother’s profession is associated with the ﬁeld of study in a similar way.
13Table 2: Descriptive statistics: covariates
Number Percent









Age in 6th grade
≤ 10 858 11.68
11 6,109 83.16
≥ 12 379 5.16
Secondary schooling track
Humanities 1,712 23.31
Economics and Social Sciences 1,733 23.59
Sciences 2,523 34.35
Vocational or Technological 1,378 18.76
Father’s profession (at the survey date)
Farmer or tradesman 1131 15.40
Executive 2213 30.13
Intermediate occupation 898 12.22
White-Collar 1468 19.98
Blue-collar 1237 16.84
Out-of-the labor force 399 5.43
Mother’s profession (at the survey date)
Farmer or tradesman 527 7.17
Executive 1226 16.69
Intermediate occupation 508 6.92
White-Collar 3269 44.50
Blue-collar 508 6.92
Out-of-the labor force 1308 17.81
Source: Surveys Générations 1992 and 1998 (CEREQ, Marseille)
14Table 3: Average monthly earnings (1992 French Francs) according to the length and the ﬁeld of
studies
Field Length Average earnings
Pooled surveys
Dropout 4,920
Two years of college 5,983
Licence (BA degree) 6,181
Maitrise (MA degree) 6,739
Post Maitrise (Graduates) 8,414
Sciences 7,277
Humanities and Social Sciences 5,942
Law, Economics and Management 6,666
Survey Génération 1992
Dropout 4,205
Two years of college 6,057
Licence (BA degree) 6,082
Maitrise (MA degree) 6,556
Post Maitrise (Graduates) 7,621
Sciences 6,833
Humanities and Social Sciences 6,088
Law, Economics and Management 6,318
Survey Génération 1998
Dropout 5,219
Two years of college 5,938
Licence (BA degree) 6,292
Maitrise (MA degree) 6,942
Post Maitrise (Graduates) 9,450
Sciences 7,758
Humanities and Social Sciences 5,835
Law, Economics and Management 6,976
Source: Surveys Générations 1992 and 1998 (CEREQ, Marseille)
5 Identiﬁcation strategy
For identiﬁability reasons, we impose usual restrictions on the type-speciﬁc heterogeneity terms
of equations 1 and 2. Namely, in the multinomial probit model corresponding to the choice
equation, we set αr
(1,1) = 0,∀r ∈ {1,...,R}, and, in the ordered probit model corresponding to
15the second equation, α1
2 = 0.
In order to identify our model, and in particular the effect of expected earnings on the prob-
ability to choose a major, without relying on distributional assumptions, we exploit variations in
the relative earnings returns induced by the business cycle. In other terms, we take into account
the fact that these relative returns depend on the year of entry into the labor market.23 Descriptive
statistics reported in Table 3 show that the relative returns to the majors changed signiﬁcantly be-
tween 1992 and 1998: these years correspond respectively to a recession and to an expansion in
the French business cycle.24 Namely, after controlling for the change in the distribution of educa-
tional levels between 1992 and 1998 as well as for inﬂation, we ﬁnd a relative increase of 13.5%
(respectively, 10.4%) in the average earnings associated with majors in sciences (respectively, in
law, economics and management) between the two periods, while the average earnings associ-
ated with majors in humanities and social sciences decreased by 4.2% over the same period.25
Besides, it seems reasonable to assume that the date of entry into the labor market has no direct
inﬂuence on the choice of the major, in other words that, other observable things being equal,
preferences for the majors were stable during this period.26 In order to identify the elasticity of
the choice of the major with respect to expected earnings, we exploit the fact that the returns to
the different majors are unequally affected by the business cycle.27 Hence, we introduce into the
earnings equation interaction terms between the chosen major and an entry year dummy. This
dummy variable is equal to zero if the individual enters the labor market in 1992, and to unity
otherwise (namely, if she enters the labor market six years later in 1998). Its interaction with
the chosen major is assumed to affect only the earnings and not the two other outcomes. This
exclusion restriction (over)identiﬁes the parameter α associated with the expected returns in the
choice equation without imposing a distributional assumption on the error terms. Besides, the
covariates indicating the father’s and mother’s professions (respectively in 1992 and 1998), the
age of the student in 6th grade, and the high-school major are included in the list of regressors
affecting the choice of the major and the determination of the length of studies, but they are
excluded from the earnings equation. Similarly to Arcidiacono (2005, section 4), these exclu-
sion restrictions, in addition to the assumed functional forms, allow to identify the unobserved
heterogeneity types. These covariates may be correlated with the individual’s preferences and
23Berger (1988) also relies on exogenous variations in the wage returns to each major according to the date of
entry into the labor market in order to identify the effect of expected earnings on college major choice. Unlike ours,
his framework does not take into account the determination of the length of studies. Besides, his results rely on the
Independence from Irrelevant Alternative assumption for the choice of the major which is unlikely to hold in such a
context.
24See Figure 1 in Appendix A.
25These relative variations between 1992 and 1998 are obtained by computing for each major the average of mean
monthly earnings conditional on each educational level, weighted by the frequency of each level.
26In particular, we should remark that no reform concerning post-secondary education was implemented in France
between 1992 and 1998. The progressive application of the Bologna process to the French post-secondary educa-
tional system began in 1999. Thus it should not affect the choice decisions of the individuals in our sample who had
already entered the labor market at that time.
27On a related ground, in a recent paper examining the career effects of graduating in a recession, Oreopoulos et
al. (2008) show that Canadian college graduates are unequally affected by the recession according to their major of
study.
16ability, represented respectively by αr
(1,j) and αr
2. Finally, considering that overcrowding may
affect educational attainment, we assume that the proportion of college students who attend the
same major in the same university than the individual may inﬂuence the length of her studies.
6 Results
Tables 12 and 13 (see Appendix B) report the parameter estimates of the equations generating
the major choice.
Students whose mother is a white-collar choose less frequently majors in Humanities and
Social Sciences, compared to Sciences, than students whose mother is an executive. Noteworthy,
students whose mother is a farmer, a tradeswoman or a white-collar worker, or whose occupies
an intermediate profession, also choose less frequently majors in Law, Economics and Manage-
ment compared to Sciences. In all other cases, parental, and in particular father’s profession has
generally no effect on the major choice.
The nationality of the student’s parents has a signiﬁcant and quantitatively large impact on
the choice of a major in Law, Economics and Management as well as in Humanities and Social
Sciences, compared to Sciences. Besides, students born abroad are signiﬁcantly less likely to
study law, economics or management. Noteworthy, female students are very signiﬁcantly less
likely to study sciences. As expected, students who obtained a Baccalauréat in sciences are
signiﬁcantly more likely to choose a post-secondary major in sciences. Students who were older
than expected (i.e. 12 years old or above) at the entry into junior high school (sixth grade) choose
less frequently a major in sciences. Finally, the expected returns in a given post-secondary major
has a statistically signiﬁcant but rather small effect on the choice of the major (see the value for
the estimate of the parameter α in Table 12).
Most covariates have a signiﬁcant impact on the length of post-secondary studies (see Table
14). For instance, students whose parents are white-collar or blue-collar workers leave the post-
secondary educational system at a lower level. Students whose both parents are French reach
generally a higher level of post-secondary education. Students who were younger than expected
(i.e. 10 years old or below) at the entry into junior high-school reach a higher level of education.
Those who obtained their Baccalauréat in sciences are also more likely to reach a higher level of
post-secondary education. When the proportion of college students who attend the same major
in the same university increases, which implies that the proportion of students preparing a BA or
MA degree is lower in this major and in this university, the individual probability of reaching a
high level of education (B.A. and above) in this major is lower, other things being equal. This
may result from the selection imposed by the university after the end of college (i.e. at the entry
in the third year of post-secondary schooling in the major), or from peers effects; this second
interpretation is the one set forth by Arcidiacono (2004, 2005). Finally, women are less likely to
pursue long studies. This is a common result in France: nowadays, on average, French women
are more educated than men, but graduated men are more numerous than women.
Table 15 gives the parameter estimates of the (log-)earnings equation. On average, earnings
are lower for females and they are higher in the region Ile-de-France (including Paris). Mean
(log-)earnings increase with the length of studies in post-secondary education. However, this in-
17crease is lower above the BA degree in humanities and social sciences. Noteworthy, the marginal
returns to each additional year of post secondary education are also lower, up to graduate level,
for the individuals entering the labor market in 1998 than for those leaving university six years
before. Besides, consistently with the fact that the individuals entering the French labor force in
1998 beneﬁt from positive economic conditions (as compared to those entering the labor mar-
ket in 1992), mean (log-)earnings are substantially higher for those leaving university in 1998.
Finally, while controlling for selection on observables and unobservables renders statistically in-
signiﬁcant the returns to the majors for the individuals leaving university in 1992, those entering
the labor market in 1998 after graduating in humanities and social sciences experience negative
relative returns.
Tables 16 and 17 report the parameter estimates of the distribution of unobserved individ-
ual heterogeneity terms. The ﬁrst group of individuals represents 38 percent of the population
of students. Individuals in this group are characterized by the lowest unobserved type-speciﬁc
preference for studying sciences as well as the highest highest type-speciﬁc earnings intercept
α3. The second group represents approximatively 34 percent of the population of students. Indi-
viduals in this group are characterized by the lowest type-speciﬁc preference α(1.3) for studies in
law, economics and management. They also have the lowest type-speciﬁc propensity (or ability)
α2 to undertake long post-secondary studies. Finally, the third group represents about 28 percent
of the population; it is both characterized by the lowest type-speciﬁc earnings intercept term α3
and the highest propensity to pursue long post-secondary studies. Table 18 reports the estimated
proportions of students in each major, at each level of post-secondary education, according to
each type, while Table 19 reports the estimated means and standard errors of log-earning distrib-
utions by type. These tables are obtained by attributing to each observed individual the type that
maximizes her posterior type probability.
The model ﬁt is quite good. Table 4 shows that the model slightly overestimates (resp. under-
estimates) the proportion of students in humanities and social sciences (resp. in law, economics
and management).
To get a more precise view of the effect of expected earnings on the choice of the post-
secondary major, we run simulation exercises that consider a 10% increase or decrease in the
expected earnings associated with a given major (see Tables 4 to 6 below).28
In general, the impacts are quantitatively small even though they are statistically signiﬁcant.
The lowest impacts concern the majors in sciences. A 10% increase in the expected earnings
associated with majors in sciences leads to an increase of 0.25 percentage points in the proportion
of students in this major. This increase is mainly compensated by a decrease of 0.19 percentage
points in the proportion of students in humanities and social sciences (see Table 4). A 10%
decrease in the expected earnings associated with majors in sciences results in almost symmetric
variations in allocations across majors.
Impacts resulting from a 10% increase or decrease in the expected earnings associated with
majors in humanities and social sciences are substantially higher although still quantitatively
small (see Table 5). For instance, a 10% increase in the expected earnings associated with a post-
28Simulating both types of variation enables us to see whether the impacts on allocations across majors are
symmetric or not.
18secondary in these majors results in an increase of about 0.53 percentage points in the proportion
of students in these majors, this increase being mainly compensated by a decrease of about 0.34
percentage points in the proportion of students in law, economics and management and to a lesser
extent by a 0.19 points decrease in the proportion of students in sciences. Once again, a 10%
decrease in expected earnings has almost symmetric impacts on allocations.
Finally, a 10% increase in the expected earnings associated with a post-secondary education
in law, economics and management majors result in an increase of 0.4 percentage points in the
proportion of students in these majors, this increase being mainly compensated by a decrease of
0.34 percentage points in the proportion of students in humanities and social sciences (see Table
6). The effects are still symmetric for a 10% decrease in the expected earnings associated with
this major.29
The preceding simulation exercises allow us to compute the sample earnings elasticities of
major choice, which present the advantage of being easily interpreted. Namely, simulating a
10% increase in the expected earnings for each major yields low elasticities of respectively 0.09
for sciences, 0.14 for humanities and social sciences, and ﬁnally 0.12 for law, economics and
management.
The results discussed above were obtained relying on the econometric framework detailed
in Section 3, which in particular does not account for log-earnings heteroskedasticity. In order
to address the fact that major choices may also be driven by major and level-speciﬁc earnings
dispersions, we also run additional estimations relying on an extension of our model accounting
for heteroskedasticity and risk aversion. Namely, we impose an exponential parametric form of
heteroskedasticity, allowing the variance of log-earnings to depend both on the major and on the
level of education. Besides, we assume that individuals value the major and the level-speciﬁc
earnings through a CRRA von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, with a risk aversion pa-
rameter taken equal to ρ = 1.1. This means that the mathematical expectations appearing in the
expression of the terms vr











j,k denote the mean and the variance of log-earnings, respectively. This alterna-
tive speciﬁcation yield fairly similar earnings elasticities of major choice (see Appendix C). The
effects of expected earnings on major choice are still signiﬁcant and quantitatively small, with
point estimates of the same magnitude.
29Given that the model we estimate a priori yields non linear effects of expected earnings on the probability to
choose each major, we also simulated 20% increases in the expected earnings associated with each ﬁeld of study.
The resulting effects are about twice (namely 1.9) larger. We therefore provide the earnings elasticities of major
choice relying only on the ﬁrst set of simulations.
19Table 4: Simulation of a 10% variation in expected earnings associated with majors in sciences
(percentages)
Observed Predicted ˆ ∆p b σˆ ∆p
proportions proportions Standard error
10% increase
Sciences 28.67 27.97 0.251 0.019
Humanities and Social Sciences 37.59 41.17 -0.189 0.013
Law, Economics and Management 33.75 30.86 -0.062 0.009
10% decrease
Sciences 28.67 27.97 -0.276 0.021
Humanities and Social Sciences 37.59 41.17 0.209 0.014
Law, Economics and Management 33.75 30.86 0.068 0.009
Source: Surveys Générations 1992 and 1998 (CEREQ, Marseille)
Remark: ˆ ∆p denotes the variation in the predicted probability due to a 10% variation in the expected earnings.
Table 5: Simulation of a 10% variation in expected earnings associated with majors in humanities
or social sciences (percentages)
Observed Predicted ˆ ∆p b σˆ ∆p
proportions proportions Standard error
10% increase
Sciences 28.67 27.97 -0.189 0.013
Humanities and Social Sciences 37.59 41.17 0.526 0.048
Law, Economics and Management 33.75 30.86 -0.336 0.038
10% decrease
Sciences 28.67 27.97 0.209 0.014
Humanities and Social Sciences 37.59 41.17 -0.580 0.053
Law, Economics and Management 33.75 30.86 0.371 0.042
Source: Surveys Générations 1992 and 1998 (CEREQ, Marseille).
Remark: ˆ ∆p denotes the variation in the predicted probability due to a 10% variation in the expected earnings.
20Table 6: Simulation of a 10% variation in expected earnings associated with majors in law,
economics or management (percentages)
Observed Predicted ˆ ∆p b σˆ ∆p
proportions proportions Standard error
10% increase
Sciences 28.67 27.97 -0.062 0.009
Humanities and Social Sciences 37.59 41.17 -0.337 0.038
Law, Economics and Management 33.75 30.86 0.399 0.042
10% decrease
Sciences 28.67 27.97 0.068 0.009
Humanities and Social Sciences 37.59 41.17 0.371 0.042
Law, Economics and Management 33.75 30.86 -0.439 0.046
Source: Surveys Générations 1992 and 1998 (CEREQ, Marseille).
Remark: ˆ ∆p denotes the variation in the predicted probability due to a 10% variation in the expected earnings.
7 Conclusion
Our results suggest a low elasticity of post-secondary major choices with respect to expected
earnings. In general, the impact of expected earnings on this choice is quantitatively small even
though it is statistically signiﬁcant. The lowest impact concerns the majors in sciences. Impact
of the expected earnings associated with majors in humanities and social sciences is substantially
higher although still quantitatively small. Increases and decreases in the expected earnings result
in almost symmetric variations in allocations across majors. Taking into account risk aversion
yields fairly similar earnings elasticities of the major choice with respect to expected earnings.
Thus it appears that the choice of a major of study which is made when entering university
is mainly driven by the consumption value of schooling which is related both to schooling pref-
erences and abilities, rather than by its investment value. Our paper provides strong evidence,
in line with the results obtained by Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2003), that, at least for the
French university context, nonpecuniary factors are a key determinant of schooling choices.
From a policy point of view, this paper suggests that the solution to the shortage for some
skills, mainly scientiﬁc in the European context, does not lie principally in ﬁnancial incentives.
Providing incentives, as often advocated, to implement gain and proﬁt-sharing schemes appears
to be unlikely to overcome skill shortages. The solution probably lies upstream, within formation
of preferences and abilities at school.
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
%Table 7: Distribution of various subgroups across majors (in percent)
Sciences Humanities Law, Economics
and Social Sciences and Management
Gender
Male 39.40 29.32 31.27
Female 16.42 48.93 34.66
Born abroad
No 25.93 40.84 33.23
Yes 26.67 38.89 34.44
Age in 6th grade
≤ 10 29.60 38.81 31.59
11 26.23 41.22 32.55
≥ 12 16.73 38.29 44.98
Father’s profession
Farmer 33.76 36.31 29.94
Tradesman 27.35 38.29 34.35
Executive 29.66 38.94 31.40
Intermediate occupations 27.13 40.23 32.64
White-collar 24.84 40.82 34.34
Blue-collar 20.62 44.96 34.42
Mother’s profession
Farmer 34.52 39.29 26.19
Tradesman 28.09 37.64 34.27
Executive 28.86 40.24 30.89
Intermediate occupations 25.32 43.35 31.33
White-collar 25.05 42.15 32.80
Blue-collar 22.39 41.42 36.19
Out-of-the labor force 25.43 36.75 37.82
Post-secondary educational level
Dropout 23.33 40.61 28.98
Two years of college 10.80 12.16 10.85
Licence (BA degree) 11.07 22.45 13.28
Maîtrise (MA degree) 16.19 12.39 25.05
Post Maîtrise (Graduates) 38.61 12.39 21.84
Secondary schooling track
Humanities 1.78 77.59 20.63
Economics and social sciences 3.74 40.71 55.56
Sciences 62.68 16.26 21.06
Vocational or technological 18.02 40.15 41.83
Source: Surveys Générations 1992 and 1998 (CEREQ, Marseille)
Remarks: Lines sum up to 100%, except for educational levels, for which columns sum up to 100%.Table 8: Proportions of students who move to another major after one year of college (in percent)
Major (ﬁrst year of college) LEM HSS S
Major (second year of college)
LEM 94.95 1.45 0.69
HSS 4.89 97.78 3.70
S 0.16 0.77 95.60
Source: Panel 1989 (DEPP, French Ministry of Education)
Remarks: Lines sum up to 100%.
Abbreviations: HSS for Humanities and Social Sciences, LEM for Law, Economics and Management, S for Sci-
ences.
Table 9: Expected and effective levels of studies (in percent)
Effective level of studies Less than college College BA MA or more
Aspiration (in ﬁrst year of college)
Less than college 33.71 12.36 28.09 25.84
College 45 20.50 17 17.50
BA 32.49 16.40 24.61 26.50
MA or more 23.06 13.97 25.40 37.57
Source: Panel 1989 (DEPP, French Ministry of Education)




Humanities and Social Sciences 1,174 34.17
Law, Economics and Management 1,168 33.99
Post-secondary education level
Dropout 518 15.08
Two years of college 281 8.18
Licence (BA degree) 742 21.59
Maîtrise (MA degree) 781 22.73
Post Maîtrise (Graduates) 1,114 32.42
Total 3,436 100
Source: Survey Génération 1992 (CEREQ, Marseille)




Humanities and Social Sciences 1,587 40.59
Law, Economics and Management 1,311 33.53
Post-secondary education level
Dropout 1,244 31.82
Two years of college 451 11.53
Licence (BA degree) 658 16.83
Maîtrise (MA degree) 705 18.03
Post Maîtrise (Graduates) 852 21.79
Total 3,910 100
Source: Survey Génération 1998 (CEREQ, Marseille)B Parameter estimates
Table 12: Choice of the major (beginning)
Covariates Estimate Standard Error
Expected earnings (α) 0.019 0.001
Sciences Ref Ref
Humanities and Social Sciences
Father’s profession
Executive Ref Ref
Farmer or tradesman -0.103 0.095






Farmer or tradesman -0.210 0.109




Born abroad -0.190 0.123
Woman 0.920 0.051
Both parents are French -0.303 0.062
Age in 6th grade
≤ 10 -0.021 0.072
11 Ref Ref




Economics and social sciences 2.287 0.082
Vocational or technological 1.164 0.064
Source: Surveys Générations 1992 and 1998 (CEREQ, Marseille)Table 13: Choice of the major (end)
Covariates Estimate Standard Error
Law, Economics and Management
Father’s profession
Executive Ref Ref
Farmer or tradesman -0.030 0.111






Farmer or tradesman -0.335 0.143




Born abroad -0.335 0.180
Woman 0.900 0.072
Both parents are French -0.343 0.084
Age in 6th grade
≤ 10 -0.031 0.092
11 Ref Ref




Economics and social sciences 3.065 0.150
Vocational or technological 1.587 0.105
Source: Surveys Générations 1992 and 1998 (CEREQ, Marseille)Table 14: Equation for the length of studies
Covariates Estimate Standard Error
Father’s profession













Born abroad 0.319 0.079
Woman -0.063 0.031
Both parents are French 0.165 0.044
Age in 6th grade
≤ 10 0.192 0.047
11 Ref Ref




Economics and social sciences -0.267 0.031
Vocational or technological -1.051 0.045
Proportion of students in the same college -1.306 0.063
Leaving post-secondary education in 1998 -0.446 0.035
Source: Surveys Générations 1992 and 1998 (CEREQ, Marseille)Table 15: Earnings equation
Covariates Estimate St. Error
Both parents are French 0.004 0.016
Region Ile de France (Paris) 0.118 0.015
Female -0.074 0.020
Born abroad 0.009 0.039
Leaving post-secondary education in 1998 0.366 0.030
Field of studies
Sciences Ref Ref
Humanities and social sciences 0.056 0.039
Law, economics and management -0.047 0.040
Level of studies
Dropout Ref Ref
Two years of college 0.397 0.050
Licence (BA degree) 0.496 0.037
Maitrise (MA degree) 0.534 0.046
Post Maitrise (Graduates) 0.760 0.039
Interactions between the major and the educational level
Humanities and social sciences
Dropout Ref Ref
Two years of college -0.087 0.053
Licence (BA degree) -0.155 0.043
Maitrise (MA degree) -0.208 0.040
Post Maitrise (Graduates) -0.194 0.048
Law, economics and management
Dropout Ref Ref
Two years of college 0.044 0.049
Licence (BA degree) -0.003 0.047
Maitrise (MA degree) -0.008 0.041
Post Maitrise (Graduates) -0.076 0.053
Interactions between the gender (female) and the educational level
Dropout Ref Ref
Two years of college 0.058 0.037
Licence (BA degree) 0.090 0.036
Maitrise (MA degree) 0.136 0.037
Post Maitrise (Graduates) 0.018 0.036
Interactions between a dummy for year 1998 and the educational level
Dropout Ref Ref
Two years of college -0.267 0.042
Licence (BA degree) -0.259 0.031
Maitrise (MA degree) -0.231 0.034
Post Maitrise (Graduates) -0.054 0.051
Interactions between a dummy for year 1998 and the major
Sciences Ref Ref
Humanities and social sciences -0.121 0.031
Law, economics and management 0.016 0.035
Source: Surveys Générations 1992 and 1998 (CEREQ, Marseille)Table 16: Other parameters
Covariance matrix of residuals (standard errors in parentheses) 

     


1 0 0 0
0 1 1.053 0
(−) (−) (0.129) (−)
0 1.053 2.379 0
(−) (0.129) (0.318) (−)
0 0 0 0.516
(−) (−) (−) (0.005)












Type 1 0.380 0.004
Type 2 0.337 0.004
Type 3 0.283 0.004
Source: Surveys Générations 1992 and 1998 (CEREQ, Marseille)




















Source: Surveys Générations 1992 and 1998 (CEREQ, Marseille)
Table 18: Estimated proportions of students in each major, at each level of post-secondary edu-
cation, by type
Major Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Sciences 0.00 44.66 50.34
Humanities and Social Sciences 41.02 55.34 17.49
Law, Business and Management 58.98 0.00 32.16
Length Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Dropout 26.40 47.55 0.00
Two years of college 12.43 16.73 0.86
Licence (BA degree) 26.81 24.42 4.58
Maitrise (MA degree) 19.77 10.53 29.43
Post Maitrise (Graduates) 14.58 0.77 65.14
Source: Surveys Générations 1992 and 1998 (CEREQ, Marseille)
34Table 19: Estimated means and standard errors of log-earnings distributions, by type
Mean St.Error
Whole sample 8.65 0.57
Type 1 8.62 0.32
Type 2 8.48 0.31
Type 3 8.84 0.29
Source: Surveys Générations 1992 and 1998 (CEREQ, Marseille)
35C Simulation exercises with risk aversion and log-earnings
heteroskedasticity
Table 20: Simulation of a 10% variation in expected earnings associated with majors in sciences
(percentages)
Observed Predicted ˆ ∆p b σˆ ∆p
proportions proportions Standard error
10% increase
Sciences 28.67 26.21 0.214 0.004
Humanities and Social Sciences 37.59 40.18 -0.070 0.003
Law, Economics and Management 33.75 33.61 -0.144 0.005
10% decrease
Sciences 28.67 26.21 -0.234 0.004
Humanities and Social Sciences 37.59 40.18 0.077 0.003
Law, Economics and Management 33.75 33.61 0.157 0.006
Source: Surveys Générations 1992 and 1998 (CEREQ, Marseille).
Remark: ˆ ∆p denotes the variation in the predicted probability due to a 10% variation in the expected earnings.
Table 21: Simulation of a 10% variation in expected earnings associated with majors in humani-
ties and social sciences
Observed Predicted ˆ ∆p b σˆ ∆p
proportions proportions Standard error
10% increase
Sciences 28.67 26.21 -0.066 0.003
Humanities and Social Sciences 37.59 40.18 0.311 0.015
Law, Economics and Management 33.75 33.61 -0.245 0.017
10% decrease
Sciences 28.67 26.21 0.073 0.003
Humanities and Social Sciences 37.59 40.18 -0.347 0.017
Law, Economics and Management 33.75 33.61 0.274 0.019
Source: Surveys Générations 1992 and 1998 (CEREQ, Marseille).
Remark: ˆ ∆p denotes the variation in the predicted probability due to a 10% variation in the expected earnings.
36Table 22: Simulation of a 10% variation in expected earnings associated with majors in law,
economics and management (percentages)
Observed Predicted ˆ ∆p b σˆ ∆p
proportions proportions Standard error
10% increase
Sciences 28.67 26.21 -0.146 0.005
Humanities and Social Sciences 37.59 40.18 -0.242 0.017
Law, Economics and Management 33.75 33.61 0.388 0.021
10% decrease
Sciences 28.67 26.21 0.163 0.006
Humanities and Social Sciences 37.59 40.18 0.269 0.018
Law, Economics and Management 33.75 33.61 -0.432 0.023
Source: Surveys Générations 1992 and 1998 (CEREQ, Marseille).
Remark: ˆ ∆p denotes the variation in the predicted probability due to a 10% variation in the expected earnings.
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